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Now that operations have started, all eyes 
are  fixed  on  the  military  intervention  in 
Libya.  That  can  only  be  useful  though  in 
the  context  of  a  comprehensive  political 
strategy  for  the  country  and  the  region. 
Crafting such a strategy is the role of the 
EU. 
Intervening  in  Libya  is  not  evident. T h e  
operation is far from being without risk and the 
outcome is as yet uncertain. But unfortunately 
there remained no other option. The European 
Union  (EU)  cannot  afford  a  civil  war  on  its 
borders.  
 
EU  vital  interests  are  directly  at  stake  in  the 
region which it calls its “Neighbourhood”: our 
neighbours on the European continent and the 
whole of the Mediterranean basin, from Turkey 
to Morocco. Trade routes, energy supply, and 
manageable  migration,  to  name  the  most 
evident. Furthermore, the EU, as a distinctive 
actor waging a value-based foreign policy, has a 
moral responsibility to protect civilians against 
violence.  
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Is  the  EU  also  a  strategic  actor,  as  its  2003 
European Security Strategy posits? I.e. an actor 
that decides on strategic priorities, obtains the 
means to pursue those, and, most importantly, 
musters the will to achieve them. If the EU 
has any pretence in that sense, it must at least 
in its immediate Neighbourhood itself assure its 
vital  interests  and  assume  its  moral 
responsibility.  That  is  why  Europe  had  to 
intervene  in  Libya,  while  indeed  in  certain 
other  regions  it  would  probably  do  so  less 
quickly. It is logical therefore that the United 
States for once does not take the lead (though 
its  military  and  political  support  is  welcome 
and necessary). This concerns Brussels much 
more than Washington.  
 
Unfortunately, the Member States of the EU 
are divided, at least with regard to the military 
operations. Therefore, operations alas cannot 
be  conducted  through  the  EU’s  Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), while the 
use of NATO command structures has given 
rise  to  debate  too.  Nevertheless,  the  EU 
inevitably will have to resume a leading role. 
For  regardless  of  whether  our  troops  are 
deployed under the EU or the NATO flag, or 
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by  an  ad  hoc  coalition:  our  comprehensive 
long-term policy towards Libya and the region 
we will have to make through the EU.  
 
The EU actually does not lack strategies for the 
Mediterranean, but it has failed to implement 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as 
intended. In the Mediterranean, Europe has in 
fact  denied  its  avowed  strategy  in  favour  of 
short-term  but  alas  also  short-sighted 
Realpolitik.  
 
The European Security Strategy is founded on 
the conviction that true stability is only possible 
if  a  State  guarantees  its  citizens  security, 
prosperity  and  political  freedom.  In  the 
Mediterranean  however  the  EU  has  allowed 
itself  to  be  led  astray  and  believe  in  a  false 
stability. Europe, and the US, have supported 
every regime that did not disrupt their policy on 
Israel-Palestine  and  was  ready  to  cooperate 
against  terrorism  and  illegal  migration.  In 
return, a blind eye was turned to the domestic 
policies, no matter how repressive. In practice, 
the  conditionality  provided  for  in  the  ENP 
(partnership  and  support  in  return  for 
promotion  of  human  rights  and  democracy) 
was rarely applied.  
 
All observers knew that this created only the 
semblance of stability and that the massive gap 
between the haves and the have-nots in terms 
of security, prosperity, and freedom, would one 
day lead to eruptions. Just it was impossible to 
predict when, and in which country first. That 
would  always  have  been  an  internally  driven 
process,  but  had  the  EU  implemented  the 
ENP,  it  could  have  quickened  the  pace  of 
peaceful transition. Now the eruption is upon 
us, but in spite of rather than thanks to the 
ENP. Europe thus lacks credibility.  
 
The EU now has a chance to make up though 
and implement its strategy for the region as it 
was  meant  to.  That  leads  to  three  strategic 
conclusions.  
 
(1)  Those  southern  neighbours  that  already 
were  or  that  now  emerge  as  democracies 
deserve our real support, notably in terms of 
investment.  Large-scale  public  infrastructure 
works  can  generate  durable  economic 
development,  are  guaranteed  to  benefit  the 
local  population,  and  are  in  the  interest  of 
Europe.  The  UN  and  the  international 
financial institutions must be Europe’s partners 
in this. A real offer in these terms can be much 
more  effective  in  assisting  the  transition  to 
democracy  than  offers  of  aiding  with  the 
organization  of  elections,  which  after  half  a 
century  of  supporting  the  local  dictator  can 
hardly be expected to raise much enthusiasm.  
 
(2) On those countries that remain autocratic, 
conditionality must be effectively applied. That 
will result in bad relations with some countries. 
The EU has been willing to pay that prize in 
the case of e.g. Belarus. It is not clear 
which benefits not paying it in the case 
of  e.g.  Tunisia  has  brought  it.  Bad 
relations  does  not  mean  no  relations. 
But  where  human  rights  are  not 
respected,  the  EU  must  keep  its 
distance and must be seen to be critical 
of the regime. In the absence of visible 
diplomatic action and, if necessary, suspension 
of  support  and  cooperation  in  the  past,  the 
ENP has lost all credibility.  
 
(3) In the context of a revitalized ENP, there 
are  red  lines  that,  if  crossed,  demand  strong 
reaction, with military means if necessary, and 
always  in  partnership  by  both  sides  of  the 
Mediterranean. This “hard” security dimension 
is necessary. Investment and support have little 
chance of success if a civil war is raging. Vice 
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versa,  military  intervention  makes  no  sense 
unless  it  is  part  of  a  comprehensive  political 
strategy aiming at a clear end-state.  
 
The EU must make sure not to lose this unique 
opportunity  to  start  afresh  and  build  the 
southern  Neighbourhood  Policy  into  a  real 
partnership.  Time  to  revitalize  our  strategy  – 
now. 
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